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The prosecution of international criminal law has been introduced into the jurisdiction of
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in a move unprecedented by the
international community. On the one hand, this can optimistically be viewed as an
attempt by the leadership of the African continent to put an end to impunity and to mete
out justice by punishing the perpetrators of the worst crimes known to human kind .
However, viewing it through the lens of the African Union's rejection of the
International Criminal Court, its open disregard for warranties issued from the Hague
and the criticism for the indictment of sitting Heads of State and Government within
Africa it may be deduced that rather than indigenizingjustice, the AU seeks to pervert
the course ofjustice.
To add fuel to this fire, the Assembly of the AU has adopted the contentious Protocol on
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights. This Amendments Protocol establishes absolute immunity for Heads of State and
Government as well as senior government officials during their tenure from prosecution
for international crimes.
This study, through extensive literature review, evaluates this position and its potential
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The idea of an African court with a criminal mandate is not novel. 1 It was conceived as
early as the enactment and adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.2 The
AU adopted the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union3 and established
the African Court of Justice (ACJ) but did not expressly bestow upon it criminal
prosecution mandate. Having two separate courts, the ACJ and the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights (AFCHPR) proved to be a challenge to the AU and they
were merged to create the African Court of Justice and Human Rights", hereinafter
called the ACJHR or the Court.
The reasons supporting this merger included the cost effectiveness of running one as
opposed to two courts, the avoiding of the problem of the partly duplicate human rights
prerogative of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Court
of Justice, potentially stronger enforcement power of a merged court and increased
likelihood that that human rights will permeate all of the jurisprudence of the Court.5
However, a host of reasons were offered for the Court's potential failure, and these
ranged from logistical concerns to legal and operational ones. Practical issues
surrounding resources and protocols were included to the list. Jurisdictional concerns
about the two courts and their varying obligations as well as matters of institutional
duality were raised."
1 Asaala E, 'The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples' Rights: An Opportunity for International
Crim inal Justice?' in Van der Merwe, International Criminal Justice in Africa: Challenges and
Opportunities, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung & Authors, 2014, 36
2 Preamble, Constitutive Act of the AU
3 Protocol of the Court ofJustice of the African Union, 2003
4 Article 2, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court ofJustice and Human Rights, 2008
5 S Sceats, 'Africa's new Human Rights Court: Whistling in the Wind?', The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, Briefing Paper, 2009
6 M Schulman, 'The African Court Of Justice And Human Rights: A Beacon Of Hope Or A Dead-End
Odyssey?' Inkundla Journal , University of Witwatersrand, 2012
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Despite this , the African Union Assembly, in its summit in February 2009, requested the
Commission of the African Union to assess the implications of mandating the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights to try International Crimes7• This would, in fact ,
further increase the mandate of the merged court. This was acted upon and in June of
2014 the Assembly of the African Union adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights Protocol (Protocol on Amendmentsj /'
The criminal mandate of the ACJHR has raised eyebrows among legal scholars, and
caused outcry from many civil society and non-governmental organizations." The main
reason for this was not , in fact the mandate of the Court to try international crimes, but
rather the grant of immunity that the Protocol awards to sitting Heads of State and
Government and senior state officials 10, for crimes that fall under the scope of
international criminality at both regional and intemational level.
The Protocol on Amendments was adopted despite objections from civil society groups
that Article 46A bis not only posed serious risks to the integrity of the ACJHR and of the
AU 's declared goal of ensuring justice for victims of serious crimes under international
law but also risked promoting impunity among sitting Heads of State, Heads of
Government and senior state officials. l ! There are therefore serious concerns that the
Court will lack the capacity to address the scourge of international crimes that have
afflicted the continent for decades now. 12
Problem
The provisions at Article 46A bis of the Protocol on Amendments, that accord immunity
to sitting Heads of State , Heads of Government and senior state officials, provide an
7 AU, Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Assembly/AU/Dec606{XVII) 2011.
S AU, Decision on the Draft Legal Instruments, Assembly/AU/Dec529{XXIII) 26-27 June 2014
9 http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/CSO-Ietter-African-Court-5-May-2014.pdf accessed on 5 March 2015
10 Article 46A bis, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights (2014)
11 http://www.africalegalaid.com/news/immunity-proposaI-for-african-Ieaders-in-the-african on 17
February 2015
12 Amnesty International, Terms of Reference for a Consultant to Undertake a Study on the Legal,
Institutional and Other Implications of the Proposed CriminalJurisdiction of the African Court ofJustice
and Human Rights,
http://www.sadcla .org/new1/sites/default/files/Amnesty ToR ACJHR Oct%202014.pdf accessed on 5
March 2015
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incentive for impunity, and disregard of international criminal law as it protects the most
likely perpetrators of the same. They also appear to contradict international consensus
and development of law. This immunity allowance seems to contravene the Member
States of the AU's commitment to fighting impunity in conformity with the provisions
of Article 4(0) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and undermine the
importance of the role that the ACJHR can play in reinforcing the pledge of the
African Union to promote continuous peace, security and stability on the African
Continent and to encourage justice and human and people 's rights.
Hypothesis
The African Union has established immunity from prosecution for international crimes
for sitting Heads of State, Heads of Government and senior government officials under
the proposed ACJHR.
Immunity is a widely accepted protection for the above mentioned persons in foreign
and domestic jurisdictions. It is not so, under international COUltS or tribunals. Further,
the proposed immunity goes against the letter and spirit of the Constitutive Act and other
legal instruments of African Union including the ACJHR Protocol and the Protocol on
Amendments. Lastly it is expressly done away with by the Rome Stature of the
Intemational Criminal Court, which is seen as the embodiment of current international
consensus on immunity.
Methodology
This research will mainly take the form of desktop research, through reading of articles,
journals and relevant online and e-resources. It will also involve library research, and
use of materials available within libraries. In the event that time and resources allow it,
there may be interviews with scholars and experts in the field of International Criminal
Law, in order to get their point of view, firsthand.
Limitations
The limitations to this study are the geographical scope of the study. It focuses on the
African Union collectively and does not necessarily factor in the specific positions of
3
particular state with regard to the subj ect matter. The views of the AU are taken to be
representative of the consensus of the member states. Further, with limited resources
available to the researcher, the stud y is limited to literature review by desktop research
into available material on all institutions and topics covered. It was not possible to make
appointments with experts in the field and the research relies on available online and
library resources.
Literature Review
The philosophy surrounding head of state immunity represents the classical theory of
international law. This is a time-honored principle, one that is founded on and one that
also protects the equality and sov ereignty of states.l ' However, recent development and
adv ancement of International Hum an Rights Law and International Criminal Law, has
influenced the modern school of thou ght for international law. It has expanded in both
jurisprudence and scope, to cover universally condemned crimes, such as genocide and
torture. When a head of stat e commits a crime under international law , these two
doctrines clash. 14
According to Reinhold Gallmetzer and Mark Klamberg , the principle of individual
responsibility for crimes under international law was recognized in the Charter and the
Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. 15 This recognition made it possible to indict and
punish individuals for grave abuses of international law. The third of the legal principles
of the Nuremberg Trials states:
"The Jact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as Head oj State or responsible government official does not
relieve him from responsibility under internationaI law. ,,16
13 Mitchel AD, 'Leave Your Hat On? Head Of State Immunity and Pinochet', 25, Monash University Law
Review, 1999, 225
14 Mitchel AD, Leave Your Hat On? Head Of State Immunity and Pinochet, 227
15 The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Judgment, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
1946




It did not matter then , one 's position or power- if one was found responsible or liable in
any way for a crime under internatio nal law, they wou ld be prosecuted. Tis precedent
from Nuremberg also established a number of other significant and associated prin ciples
aimed at ensuring individual culp ability for crimes under international law, such as the
crimes punishable under international law, and Principle IV, which states : "The fact that
a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relie ve him
from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible
to him" .17 This Individual criminal accountability developed furth er in the context of the
Balkan wars'" and the Rwandan genocide. 19 20
Like the statutes of the 1CTy21 and the ICTR22 , the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court makes provisions for the principle of individual criminal responsibility
of natural persons." Furthermore, it applies equally to all persons without any
exceptions based on official capacity, such as a Head of State or Government, a member
of a Governm ent or parliament , an elected representative or a government offici al.24It
states:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person front criminal responsibility under this Statute,
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a gro und f or reduction ofsentence. Immunities or
special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court front exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person.
17 Gallm etzer Rand Klamberg M, 'Individual responsibility for Crimes under International Law, the UN Ad
hoc Tribunals and the International Criminol Court', The Summer School on International Crim ina l Law,
2005,61
18 Article 7(2), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 1993, UNSC
S/RES/827 (1993)
19 Article 6(2), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994, UN5C S/RES/995 (1994)
20Rau K, 'Jurisprudential Innovation or Accountability Avoidance? The International Criminal Court and
Proposed Expansion of the African Court ofJustice and Human Rights ' Minnesota Law Review, 2012
21 Article 7(2), Statute of the ICTY
22 Article 6(2), Statute of the ICTR
23 Article 25, Rome Statute if the Internationa l Crimina l Court, 2002
24 Article 27, Rome Statute
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Finally, there is a specific provision dealing with the criminal responsibility or liability
of Commanders and other superiors." International conventions, including the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.i" the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.", and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 recognize the importance of
accountability for individuals who have committed serious crimes irrespective of their
official position.
These provisions set the tone for international consensus on individual criminal
responsibility. International Criminal Justice standards do not allow for persons who are
not subject to law, more so, those whose actions violate international criminal law. This
appears to not be the case , where the ACJHR is concerned. Dr. Ken Obura asserts that,
an examination of international law confirms that international obligation to prosecute
and punish international crimes exists. This is the first discourse against the
implementation of Article 46 A bis of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on
the Statute of the African COUli of Justice and Human Rights.28
Article 46 A of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the
African COUli of Justice and Human Rights states thus:
'No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any
serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such
capacity, or other senior state officials based on their fun ctions, during their tenure of
office ,.29
It goes further to enunciate under Article 46B that ,
25 Article 28, Rome Statute
26 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,10
December 1984 UNTS 1465
27 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, UNTS 1021
28 Obura K'Duty to Prosecute International Crimes under International Law', in Murungu C and Biegon J
(Eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa, Pretoria University law Press, 2011, 14-31




(1) 'A person who commits an offence under this Statute shall be held
individually responsible for the crime
(2) Subject to the provisions of Article 46Abis of this Statute, the official
position of any accused person shall not relieve such person of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
This part of the Statute generally confers immunity to sitting Heads of States, Heads of
Governments to senior state officials, regardless the crimes they commit.
The move to establish an international crimes court within the African region was
viewed as a leap forward in the legal and jurisprudential field of Africa. Thus, despite
the many criticisms it received, it seemed that there was hope and a step in the right
direction for Africa. However, it appeared that this move forward was quickly undone
by the provision to protect Heads of State and Senior Government Officials from
criminal liability for their actions. Critics of the new structure of the ACJHR argue that
some amendments to the Protocol have twisted the ACJHR into a mechanism that
will protect these state officials from being targeted by the International Criminal Court
(ICC)30
Immunity takes away the possibility that victims can find justice at the ACJHR when
leaders commit atrocities." Angela Mudukutr'" puts forward that "Instead of retreating
from important achievements to limit impunity, advance the rule of law, and promote
respect for human rights, African governments should remain steadfast in supporting
justice for victims of the worst crimes by rejecting immunity before the African COUli."
Granting sitting heads of state and senior government officials immunity from the
jurisdiction of African courts would be an exercise in shielding these leaders from
accountability and, in effect, permit such leaders to perpetuate these human rights
abuses.
30 The African Court for Justice and Human Rights: Protecting Africans, or Just Africa's Leaders], 359
Briefing Paper, South African Catholic Bishops Conference Parliamentary Liaison Office, 2014
31 http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/24/african-states-reject-immunity-leaders accessed on 5 March
2015
32 ICJ Project lawyer, South African litigation Centre.
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However, before criticizing this move, it is important to look into the reason behind the
enactment of this provision.
The African Union has often expressed concern over the indictment of sitting Heads of
State, such as Omar AI-Bashir of Sudan and President Uhuru Kenyatta of
Kenya. 33According to some, it perceives international justice as an impediment to peace,
given that indictment of a Head of State could lead to civil unrest and political feud.
This, given the history of Africa, is a plausible concern. It is, perhaps, with this in mind
that the controversial article has been incorporated into the Protocol on Amendments to
the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
This research will look into the international consensus and standards for immunity
against individual criminal responsibility for international crimes, and then delve into
the view of the African Union, as encapsulated in the Protocol on Amendments to the
Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. After that, seeking the
loopholes that exist in the attempt to obtain justice for both victims and perpetrators of
inte rnational crimes.
Chapter Breakdown
The writer begins with an introduction and back ground into the research topic-
Immunity for certain high ranking sitting representatives of state. Following that, the
writer seeks to establish what the international norm is, and back it with both writings
and cases that have arisen under international criminal law in the last century.
Thereafter, an analysis is made of Article 46A bis of the protocol on Amendments,
critiquing the rationale behind it and its contravention of the objectives of the African
Union. Finally, the study concludes with an attempt at recommendations for the African
Union and more so the Statutes relating to the ACJHR mandate over international
criminal law.
The writer does not attempt to determine whether the provision for immunity under the
Protocol on Amendments is lawful, as has been done by other authors. The principle
33 AU, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec. 243-267 (XIII) 2009
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objective is to determine whether it will potentially hamper the proper functioning of the
ACJHR
9
CHAPTER TWO: IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
This chapter provides a theoretical basis for the principle of immunity. The questions for
which answers are sought are: What is immunity? What is the importance of immunity
under International Law? Finally, what are the philosophical justifications for immunity?
It avers that immunity for sitting Heads of State and Government as well as senior
government officials in certain instances, is a right accorded to every sovereign state. It
ensures proper functioning of the state in its various capacities, and is a sign of respect
for the autonomy and sovereignty of the state. The chapter attempts to develop the
context within which the immunity provisions of the Protocol on Amendments to the
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights" (hereinafter,
the Protocol) will be examined.
What is Immunity?
Immunity refers to a legal status where a principle or an entity is exempt from criminal
prosecution or civil liability in order to protect "societal claims" that outweigh the
liability in that instance." These may range from the necessary protection of state
officers in the rightful pursuit of their duties, to immunities invoked in times of war or
other state emergencies."
Historically, immunity from criminal liability is seen to have originally come about
through the sovereign in a constitutional monarch.V This sovereign immunity was a
principle by which the sovereign could not be found to have committed an illegal act:
rex /10/1 potest peccare which is translated to 'the king can do no wrong'. 38 This was not
to mean that the sovereign was above the law and could do as they pleased with no mind
for right or wrong, but that they could not be found answerable to the people- the
sovereign's subj ects- as they would before them. It is further understood as a duty of the
34 AU, Decision on the Draft Legal Instruments, Assembly/AU/Dec529(XXIII) 26-27 June 2014
35 Knowles D, Political Obligation: A Critical introduction, Routledge, 2009, 26
36 Knowles D, Political Obligation: A Critical introduction, 26
37 Broom H , A Selection of Legal Maxims: Classified and Illustrated, 23
38 Broom H, A Selection of Legal Maxims: Classified and Illustrated, Stevens and Norton, 1845, 23
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crown to not engage in any unlawful conduct. Rather than being beyond the rule of law,
the crown cannot, may not, do any wrong/"
Par in parent non habet il11perilllll40 is a principle of public international law that means
that 'one sovereign power cannot exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign power'.
This is the basis for the doctrines of 'act of state' and sovereign immunity. Immunity for
state officials from the jurisdiction of another state developed within this context. The
actions of a state official are seen to be the actions of the state itself and the criticism and
passing of judgment upon the conduct of another state is deemed interference with that
state's right to independence, a right that is recognized and codified under the
international law." The adjudicating state would implicitly be making its own opinions
superior to that of the other state and claiming jurisdiction over it.
There are two broad categories of immunity under international law: immunity ratione
personae and immunity ratione materiae.
Immunity Ratione Personae
Immunity ratione personae is accorded to whoever holds the highest office in a state, and
to the person responsible for its international relations. It is accepted under international
customary law that heads of state , heads of government and foreign affairs ministers
enjoy this total status immunity from foreign criminal prosecution, this is prosecution
under the jurisdiction of foreign courts , for both private and official acts committed
before or during their tenure. 42 These persons, without having to produce evidence of
full powers are considered to be representing their state43 and they enjoy this personal
immunity by the mere fact of the office they hold .44
39 Broom H , A Selection of Legal Maxims: Classified and Illustrated, 24
40 'Equals do not have authority over one another'
http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100306400 on 12 December 2015
41 Article 2, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTSXVI
42 0,Argent P, 'Immunity of State Officials and Obligation to Prosecute' 4, Cahiers du Le Centre Charles de
Visscher pour Ie droit international et europeen (CeDIE), (2013), 6
4 3 Article 7, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1-18232
44 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment, leJ Reports
2002,20
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The Head of State is the highest representative of a country and is considered the
personification of the state. They are a symbol of the sovereignty of the nation'" and by
virtue of this position, their person is inviolable.46 In Francis Oppenheim's words, " The
highest organ oj the state, representing it, within and without its borders, in the totality
of its relations is the Head oJState ,.47 It would, therefore, be deemed an affront to their
state if they are prosecuted before any courts. In some countries, the role of the Head of
State and the Head of Government are held by the same person. However, in others , the
role is separate, and the Head of State is more ceremonial, as is the case in the United
Kingdom, where the Head of State is the Queen, while the Head of Government is the
Prime Minister. However, the immunity accorded to one is the same as the other as they
are equally seen as high ranking representatives of their state , and do not need to
produce evidence of their authority.
A foreign minister oversees their nation's international relations and diplomatic affairs. 48
They are in charge of their state's embassies and consuls.l" The purpose of this
immunity is not for their own personal benefit, but for the efficient performance of their
functions in representing the state.i" This position was further enunciated in case
concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v
Belgium)"
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) , this immunity is further
extended conditionally to diplomats and members of special missions in the states in
which they are accredited, the condition being that the immunity only be for possible
criminal proceedings in said states .52 In Re Bo Xilai" , the Chinese Minister for
45 Binkley WE, 'The President as a National Symbol' 283 The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science (1952), 90
46 Franey EH, ' Immunity, Individuals and International Law: Which Individuals are Immune from the
Jurisdiction of national Courts under International Law?' Unpublished PhD Thesis, London School of
Economics, June 2009, 78
47 Oppenheim LFL, Interrnational Law (Volume 1) 9, Oxford University Press, 1992, 1033
48 Franey, Immunity, Individuals and International Law, 97
49 Article 10, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, UNTS500
50 Preamble, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
51 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Reports
2002,22
52 Article 31(1), Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations





International Trade was granted immunity from prosecution based on allegations of
conspiracy to torture. The reasoning behind this was on the basis of the Arrest Warrant
Case. The COUlt adjudged that Mr Bo was eligible for immunity as part of a diplomatic
mission and would not be able to perform his function unless he were able to travel
freely. 54 Two challenges face the application of this kind of immunity, the first being
that the courts have not always been able to conclusively determine what the minimum
threshold for 'high ranking ' official is, and criteria for this has varied in the past. " The
second challenge is that applying immunity on the basis of an office being charged with
international functions has broadened the spectrum. Today, there is a wider range of
officials who would fall under such category.
Immunity ratione personae is limited in three material ways. Once a person protected by
immunity ratione personae ceases to the hold office through which such immunity was
made available to them, their immunity ceases to exist. i" This means that they may be
found liable for personally liable for acts of a private nature as was in Ex King Farouk of
Egypt v Christian DiOl·.57 The second way is by waiver- if the state represented waives
the immunity of its own state officer, it then ceases to exist as wel1.58
The third and perhaps the most relevant to the following is discussion IS the non-
recognition of this immunity under International Criminal Law. This position,
established in the aftermath of the Second World War has been widely upheld as evident
in the number of state patties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(hereinafter the Rome Stahlte).59
Immunity Ratione Materiae
This kind of immunity, also known as functional immunity, attaches to the acts
performed by state officials in the carrying out of their functions or the discharge of their
roles. It is conferred upon those performing ' acts of state ' and includes more than just
the state officials covered under personal immunity. This means all representatives of
54 Re Bo Xilai, 713
55 Franey, Immunity, Individuals and International Law, 128
56 D'Argent, Immunity of State Officials and Obligation to Prosecute', 7
57 France, Court of Appeal of Paris, 11 April 1957 24 International Law Review 228
58 D'Argent, Immunity of State Officials and Obligation to Prosecute',
59 Article 27, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) UNTS2187
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the state acting as such or 'all the natural persons who are authorized to represent the
State in all its manifestations ,6 0 fall under the blanket of functional immunity. The scope
of immunity ratione materiae is wider than that of immunity ratione personae, and
attaches to the official even after the conclusion of the term of the official. It extends to
jus imperii or public acts of the state and jure gestionis which are private or commercial
acts of the state provided they were not done in private capacity, but officially."
The underlying idea for this immunity is that you cannot sue the agent in absence of the
Principal.I" They are acting on behalf of the Principal, in this case the state, and are not
individually responsible for what they do as it is their duty. To make the agent a
defendant therefore, was to subject a foreign sovereign to the jurisdiction of the courts of
another- a position widely accepted as contrary to customary international law
While this paper is focused on immunity from criminal prosecution, it is perhaps of
import to briefly discuss the doctrine of restrictive immunity. This refers to
circumstances where a state can in fact be sued , and developed with the appreciation of a
state's ability to engage in activities that a private person could engage in as well, known
as acta jure gestionis or acts of a private nahlre.63 This is as opposed to acta jure imperii
or acts of a sovereign, which are covered under immunity. For example, when a
government enters into a contract for purchase of supplies, they are bound to honor it as
an ordinary person would, and the seller has right to remedies through the judicial
system, against the purchaser who is the government. The defendant in such a suit would
be the government itself, and not the agent authorized to execute the documents on its
behalf.
Justifications and Importance of Immunity.
The principle of immunity is closely linked with the sovereignty and autonomy of a
state. It prevents a state from criticizing or adjudicating on the merits or lawfulness of a
state 's actions or policy. Where a state 's sovereignty cannot and should not , under
international law, be challenged by another, it therefore stands that its actions are not
60 International Law Commission, Report of the 43'dSession, 1991, 18
61 D'Argent, Immunity of State Officials and Obligation to Prosecute', 8
62 Twycross and others v Dreyfuss Brothers and others 1877, [1874 -80) All ER , 133




subject to scrutiny in another jurisdiction. Immunity is often accorded to persons who by
virtue of the office that they hold, are seen as the embodiment of the state they
represent" Immunity for these individuals from criminal prosecution in foreign courts,
or in an international court or tribunal is thus considered important and as such is limited
to only high ranking government officials. In Jones v Ministry of Interior of The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and others,65 Lord Bingham said that "A state can only act
through servants and agents, their official acts are acts of the state and the state's
immunity in respect of them is fundamental to the principle of state immunity".66
Therefore, the actions of a state's highest officers, or the actions of a state official
pursuant to the carrying out of their duty are seen as actions of the state itself. Subjecting
a state agent to the jurisdiction of another is tantamount to insult to that state.
Another argument for immunity states that this privilege is necessary for the proper
carrying out of the official's functions or duties to their state. In Democratic Republic of
the Congo v Belgium'" an arrest warrant against the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, issued by Belgium under its universal jurisdiction
laws had been sent out to many countries. The International Court of Justice gave
reference to precedence in the high courts of the United Kingdom and France, which
asserted that immunity was not granted to state officials for their personal benefit, but to
ensure the effective performance of their duties68.This position was in line with The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties69 as earlier stated. The COUl1 went further to
say that being a minister of foreign affairs meant that the minister, against whom the
warrant was filed, was in charge of handling the relations between the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and other states. He could not do so while apprehensive of
potential arrest should he set foot in another country.
Immunity is also important for purposes of diplomatic harmony. As stated earlier, states
will often avoid antagonizing one another and this may be through the arrest and/or
64 0,Argent, Immunity of State Officials and Obligation to Prosecute ', 6
65 [2009] QB, 699
66 Jones v Ministry of Interior, Lord Bingham, para. 30
67 Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium, 6
68 Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium, 22
69 Preamble, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
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indictment of a high ranking government official of a foreign state. This is often the
clashing point between the competing interests ofjustice and international relations. i''
Immunity for protected persons from criminal prosecution in foreign courts is not as
straight-forward in International Criminal Law.
Individual criminal responsibility is a general principle of law under both national and
international criminal law." It is now accepted under international law that individuals
must be held accountable for international crimes, regardless the position of their own
states or the states in which such crimes were committed" This was affirmed by the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in stating that this principle can be applied
to natural persons as subjects of International Criminal Law , irrespective of the
provisions of national legislation73 and in the adoption of the Statutes of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTy)74, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR/5 and the International Criminal Court (ICC)76 as well as
Article 2 (1), (2) and (3) of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind of the International Law Commission (ILC).77 The judgment of the
International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg stated that , "Crimes against
International Law are committed by men , not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of International Law be
cnforcedv"
7070 Foakes J, 'Immunity for International Crimes', 4
71 Bassiouni MC, International Criminal Law: Sources, Subjects and Contents, Brill, 2008, 46
72 Foakes J, 'Immunity for International Crimes: Developments in the Law on Prosecuting Heads of State
in Foreign Courts', 2 International Law Programme (2011), 2
73 UNGA, Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal, UN A/Res/95 /236, 11 December 1946
74 Articles 7 (1) and 23 (1), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 1993,
UNSCS/RES/827 (1993)
75 Articles 6 (1) and 22 (1), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994, UNSC
S/RES/995 (1994)
76 Article 25, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002
77 UNGA, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Titles and texts ofArticles on
the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind adopted by the International Law
Commission at its forty-eighth session, UN A/Res/4/532 (1996)
78 The Trialof German Major War Criminals, Judgment, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
1946,55
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So far , it has been established that immunity for Heads of State and Heads of
Government from criminal prosecution is recognized under both domestic and
international law. This protection is often absolute for the duration of their tenure and
extends to senior government officials mainly by virtue of the office they hold and to
lesser officials for functions performed on behalf of the state. The reasons for this range
from the protection of the sovereignty of the state through protection of its actors, to the
need for ensuring civil and political stability within the states. The next chapter looks
further into this principle and its application under International Criminal Law and
chapter four examines the provisions for immunity under the African Union's mandate
through the African Court of Justice and Human Rights .
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CHAPTER THREE: INTERNATIONAL LEX LATA ON
IMMUNITY FOR SITTING HEADS OF STATE FROM
PROSECUTION FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
Immunity has for a long time been considered legitimate and necessary under
international law. To avoid conflicts, societies have needed reassurances that their
representatives would remain unharmed when out of their home territories. Thus the law
developed at both domestic and international levels to make inviolable the person of a
state representative." However, in the last century international criminal law appears to
have taken, or to be taking a different approach with regard to immunity from criminal
prosecution specifically for international crimes. This is to say that while immunity for
state representatives, more so high ranking state officials is widely accepted as the norm,
there has emerged a trend where prosecution of crimes perceived to be of worst kind
take precedence over both the immunity ratione tnateriae and immunity ratione
personae of said officials before an international court or tribunal. This chapter seeks to
analyze this premise and examine why this shift is taking place.
Obura asserts that, 'once a crime has been identified as having jus cogens status, it
inevitably imposes obligations erga otnnes or obligations owed to all mankind.,80 A
close evaluation of international law affirms that the international obligation to prosecute
and punish international crimes actually exists. 81 This is the first discourse against the
implementation of Article 46A bis of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on
the Statute of the African COUli of Justice and Human Rights .
Customary International Law and the Specialized International Courts
and Tribunals
The last decade of the Twentieth Century saw the establishment of a number of
specialized courts and tribunals to address crimes considered to be of international
import and to ensure the people behind them were punished accordingly. These
institutions reinforced an already recognized norm that international crimes could not go
79 Cryer R, Friman H, Robinson D and Wilmshurst E, An Introduction to Internotional Criminal Law and
Procedure, Cam bridge University press, 2007, 422
80 Obura K, 'Duty to Prosecute International Crimes under International Law', in Murungu C and Biegon J
(Eds) Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa, Pretoria University law Press, 2011, 14
81 Obura K, 'Duty to Prosecute International Crimes under International Law', 31
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unpunished and had in them clauses to ensure those most responsible for them were
dealt with at law.82
The Charter and Constitution of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) of Nuremberg
states that, "The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible
officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment.t'v' Following the Second World War, many
high ranking officials of the German National Socialism Party were indicted and
convicted of various international crimes. The Tribunal was tasked with bringing to
justice the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against peace
as defined in the Charter of the IMT and did so with no heed to the official ranking of
the defendants, many of whom were very senior government officials. This was one of
the first landmark cases under international criminal law where no regard was given to
the doctrine of immunity of any kind. Similarly, the Charier of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) stated that , "Neither the official position, at any time,
of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his government or
of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any
crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in mitigation
of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.,,84
The statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia f and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda86 both of which were mandated by the UN
have identical wording in stating that 'the official position of any accused person,
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment'. Slobodan
Milosevic was indicted by the ICTY while he was still the President of the Federal
82 Obura K, 'Duty to Prosecute Internationa l Crimes under International Law', 25
83 Article 7, Nuremberg Charter of the International Military Tribunal Constitution , 1945
84 Article 6, International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter , 1946, TIAS/1589
85 Article 7 (2), Statute of the ICTY, 1993, UNSC S/RES/827 (1993)
86 Article 6 (2), Statute of the ICTR, 1994, UNSC S/RES/99S (1994)
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Republic of Yugoslavia.V This move echoed the Nuremberg Trials and Principles, over
half a century later.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone held in its Decision88 that was based on the Statute
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone'" that the special court had competence to
prosecute 'persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law,9o and the ' official position
(including as Head of State) of such persons shall not relieve them of criminal
responsibility nor mitigate punishment' .91
In the An-est Wan-ants Case, the IC] stated in its judgment that an incumbent or former
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who really is a person considered a high ranking official in
the government as discussed in chapter two here, may be subjected to criminal
proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they are found to have
jurisdiction.V This implicitly means that persons who are protected by immunity ratione
personae can be prosecuted under international criminal law for international cnmes
under certain statutes. The immunity at this level therefore, is no longer absolute.
The International Criminal Court and the Principle of Irrelevance of
Official Capacity
Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal COUli stipulates the
principle of irrelevance of official capacity. It states:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from
87 Prosecutor v. Siobodan Miiosevic(2005),Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Kosta Bulatovic Contempt
Proceedings), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IT-02-54-A-R77.4
88 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (2003), Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, Special Court for
Sierra Leone, SCSL-2003-01-1
89 UNSCS/RES/1315 (2000), 2
90 Article 1 (1), Statute of the SCSL
91 Article 6 (2), Statute of the SCSL
92 Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium, 26
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criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, 111 and of itself,
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not
bar the COUli from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
Where a state has subscribed to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal COUli, the
immunity provisions often afforded to senior government officials at national level, and
in foreign domestic courts is cast aside. From the Preamble of its statute, it is evident
that one of the objectives of the ICC is to put an end to impunity and contribute to the
prevention of international crimes. This is therefore made possible by making sure that
there are not technical legalities or loopholes that a person who has committed such
crimes may use to evade justice.
The Rome Statute is the unification of various principles of international law that have
been practiced, even codified in the Statutes of specialized courts and tribunals. The
purpose for this was to create long lasting solutions to conflict that are primarily cause
by the blatant disregard of law and rampant criminal activity of leaders who felt above
it. These violations often led to large scale abuse of human rights and little if any justice
for the victims. Therefore, immunity which might have barred prosecution is disregarded
at this level.
Another key reason for this prOVISIOn is the complementarity principle. The Rom e
Statute recognizes the need for states to first try to rectify a conflict at the national level
and thus the ICC is s court of last resort." However, many constitutions endorse
immunity for sitting Heads of State and Heads of Government and the municipal courts
have no authority to try them . The ICC, therefore, is a tool to correct this loophole that
has marred many judicial systems and that has been abused by holders of senior
government post.
In practice, therefore, the rules on immunity ratione personae give way in the face of
prosecution under international criminal tribunals.
93 Preamble and Article 17, Rome Statute
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CHAPTER FOUR: IS THE PROPOSED IMMUNITY
UNDER ARTICLE 46A BIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON
AMENDMENTS DETRIMENTAL TO THE MANDATE OF
THE ACJHR?
The African Union at its twenty third Ordinary Session Summit in Malabo, adopted a
protocol'" to enlarge the mandate of the proposed African Court of Justice and Human
and Rights (ACJHR) to include original and appellate jurisdiction over international
crimea." This is the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (the Protocol on Amendments). It revises the
Protocol on the Statute of the African COUl1 of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR
Protocol) that was adopted in 2008 and has not yet come into force . If adopted, the
jurisdiction of the African COUl1 of Justice and Human Rights will extend beyond
interstate dispute and state responsibility for human rights violations, and allow it to try
individuals on the basis of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes.
The comprehensive list of crimes within the scope of the International Criminal Section
of the COUl1 expressly includes the following crimes: Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity, War Crimes , the Crime of Unconstitutional Change of Govemment (UCG) ,
Piracy, Terrorism, Mercenarism, Corruption, Money Laundering, Trafficking in Persons,
Trafficking in Drugs, Trafficking in Hazardous Wastes, Illicit Exploration of Natural
Resources and the Crime of Aggression.f" It goes on to define each of these crimes in
detail. Further, the protocol allows the Assembly, with the consent of the State Parties to
add to this already broad list in order to reflect developments under intemational law.97
This move has been recognized as a step forward for Africa , which has long suffered
from mass violations of human rights ." It is seen as a potential tool to fight impunity
94 AU, Decision on t he Draft Legal Instruments, Assembly/AU/ Dec529(XXIII) 26-27 June 2014
95 Art icle 3, Prot ocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights, 2014
96 Article 28A (1), Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights, 2014
97 Article 28A (2), Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights, 2014
98 Mbaku JM, ' Intern ational Justice : The International Criminal Court and Africa', The Brookings
Institution, 2014
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and prevent the unchecked exercise of power that leaves many of the continent's leaders
unaccountable for their actions.
Despite the potential regional advancement in international criminal law and even
human rights law, the African Union has suffered severe criticism for the provisions
embodied under Article 46A bis. This article proscribes immunity for sitting Heads of
State and Government, as well as other senior government officials for crimes under the
Protocol on Amendments for the duration of their term.
The Basis for International Criminal Jurisdiction in the ACJHR
Before beginning the analysis on the immunity provisions of Article 46 A bis of the
Protocol, it is important to understand the basis for this international criminal
jurisdiction in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (The Court). Then it may
be better understood how the immunity provisions could hamper the effective
functioning of the Court in executing its mandate under the ACJHR Protocol and the
Protocol on Amendments .
The idea of such jurisdiction is not new to the continent and neither is it, as studies have
revealed, a consequence of the fallout between the International Criminal Court and
Africa even if the latter did indeed accelerate the process." The reasons for the extended
jurisdiction are given as follows.
The legal obligation on the African Union, derived from its constitutive act, to intervene
in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity .100
Interestingly, these are the same crimes that are envisioned in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).
During the drafting of the African Chmiel' on Human and Peoples' Rights, an African
judicial institution with criminal jurisdiction was envisioned.l'" This was motivated by
the apartheid rule in South Africa that was labeled a crime against humanity by the
99 Abass A, 'Prosecut ing International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and Challenges'
24(3)European Journal of International Law (2013), 936
100 Art icle 4(h), Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000 )
101 Abass A, 'Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa : Rationale, Prospects and Challenges',937
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United Nations General Assembly.1 02 However, it was deemed premature, as there were
already plans by the United Nations for an international court to repress crimes against
mankind.l'" A penal court for this crime was never established and the AU felt the need
to address matters that were of grave concern to the African people, but which
seemingly did not have much prosecutorial weight on the international scene.
The AU is mandated to prosecute crimes peculiar to the African continent that are not
under the jurisdiction of the ICC and are not recognized as international crimes in the
rest of the world. One such crime is the crime of Unconstitutional Change of
Government (UCG)104 which has been a source of conflict in many parts of the
continent.l'" The criminalization of UCG can also be said to be a preventative measure:
where the ICC deals with crimes that are often the aftermath of disruption of law and
order, the AU seeks to deal with the matter before it cscalates.l'" This recognition of
UCG in Africa began with the influence of the OAU on state practice, led to customary
practice of the same and finally after pronouncements and the Lome Declaration of
2000 107, it led to the adoption of the African Charter on Democracy Elections and
Governance in 2007.108 Without the provisions for prosecution of international crimes in
its judicial arm, the AU would only have managed to enact unenforceable legislation, so
to speak.
Analysis of Article 46 A Bis
Article 46A bis of the Protocol on Amendments:
102 UNGA, the Policies of Apartheid of the Government af the Republic afSouth Africa, UN
A/Res/2202 (XXI) 16 December 1966
103 OAU, Rapporteur's Report of the Ministerial Meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, Organization ofAfrican
Unity, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/Draft. Rapt. Rpt (II)
104 Article 28 (el, Protocal on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court ofJustice
and Human Rights, (2014)
105 Abass A, 'Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa : Rationale, Prospects and Challenges', 939
106 Article 2, African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance, Assembly/AU/Dec. 147 (VIII)
(2007) .
107 Declaration on the Framework for an AU response to Unconstitutional Changes to Government, OAU
Doc/AHG/Dec.5 (XXXVI) (2000)






"No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any
serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in
such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, during their
tenure of office."I09
The immunity envisioned under Article 46A bis is immunity ratione personae as it is
accorded to a person by virtue of the office they hold, as opposed to mere performance
of official duties. Two characteristics of this immunity can be adduced from the wording
of the Protocol: it is absolute and it is temporary.i!" It is absolute, in that it states
categorically under this article 46A bis that "no charges shall be commenced or
continued . . ." and there are no exceptions listed in the same. Further, this position is
asserted by the exception to individual criminal liability under Article 46B of the
Protocol on Amendments, which states that subject to the provisions of Article 46A bis a
person shall be held individually criminally liable for crimes under the jurisdiction of the
COUli, regardless their official position. III
The immunity under the Protocol on Amendments is temporary. It affords the protection
from prosecution to "serving" Heads of State or Government, or anybody acting or
entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions,
"during their tenure of office". Therefore, when one has ceased to hold the office
through which they held this immunity, they are no longer immune to the jurisdiction of
the Court.
Proponents of this immunity clause argue that there are possible positive outcomes
brought forth by this Article 46A bis. On the one hand, the argument goes, Heads of
State, Heads of Government and other protected persons are better able to perform their
function of they do not feel threatened and at risk at the COUli if they are adequately
protected. The AU legal Counsel justified it as a compromise to allow government
109 Article 46A bis, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court ofJustice
and Human Rights (2014)
110 Du Plessis M, 'Shambolic, Shameful and Symbolic: Implications of the African Union's Immunity for
African Leaders' r 278 Institute for Security Studies Paper (2014), 7
111 Article 46B, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court ofJustice and
Human Rights
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officials to fully tend to their duties. 112 Further, it is seen as a deterrent, as the holders of
immunity are not immune for the actions done after they leave office. Therefore, the
temporal nature of the immunity serves as an incentive to act in good faith and not
engage in actions that would constitute international crimes under the Protocol on
Amendments.
Criticism for Article 46a Bis
Critics of this immunity provision generally cite three potential consequences, should
the adopted protocol come into force:
1. The immunity provision may render defunct some provisions of the
Protocol, in particular, the possible prosecution of perpetrators of
international crimes
The inclusion of several 'new' crimes to the list of international crimes has seen the
introduction in particular of something that may be the most common cause of conflict
in the African Continent: the crime of Unconstitutional Change of Government
(UCG).ll3 Prohibited under Articles 28A (l) and 28E of the Protocol on Amendments,
this crime includes the illegal replacement of democratically elected governments,
preventing a democratically elected government from ascending to power by refusing to
relinquish power and changing the law in order to maintain one 's authority, contrary to
the constitution of the country. However, if a person successfully carries out such action
and becomes the sitting Head of State or Government, they would be entitled to
immunity under provisions of Article 46A bis of the Protocol on Amendments.
Therefore, this provision may potentially bar the effectiveness of the Court in carrying
out its mandate. 114 The Court would have no authority or ability to rectify such wrongs.
This would render that part of the Protocol redundant.
112 Kanyogonya TN, The Relationship between the proposed African Court of Justice and Human and
Peoples' Rights and the International Criminal Court: Questions of Jurisdiction and Complementarity,
Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 16 June 2015, 23
113 Abass A, 'Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa: Rationale, Prospects and Challenges', 939
114 Du Plessis M, 'Shambolic, Shameful and Symbolic', 8
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2. The immunity provision increases the risk of African leaders holding on
to power, long after their tenures.
The proposed immunity clause offers temporal protection, in that the persons granted
such immunity have it for the duration of their tenure. However, this temporary nature
could turn these terms into permanent positions especially for Heads of State or Heads
of Government who have committed crimes under the Protocol on Amendments. I IS This
is because the protection is stripped once they are out of office, and they may then face
the law for their actions after their terms. This is compounded by the fact that the
immunity attaches to the office that the person holds , rather than to official functions.
Thus it becomes an incentive to hold on to power in order to avoid facing the proverbial
music.
3. The immunity clause has too wide a scope of protected persons.
The phrasing of Article 46A bis raises concern where it includes "other senior state
officials based on their functions". This is a very wide scope , as it does not state who
these officials are and what functions make the one carrying them out a senior state
official. I 16 Such ambiguity would leave the definition to the court 's discretion. However,
it is reasonably apprehensible that this discretion could easily be manipulated.
It is therefore perceivable that the proposed immunity places at risk thousands of men
women and children who have been and others who may be victims of heinous
international crimes as the judicial mechanism with the mandate and authority to make
accountable the perpetrators would be barred from doing so.
The AU has also been criticized for passing the Protocol on Amendments in a rush ,
failing to give time and voice to civil society groups through interested Non-
Governmental Organizations and non-government experts. I 17
115 Du Plessis M, 'Shambolic, Shameful and Symbolic', 7
116 Du Plessis M, 'Shambolic, Shameful and Symbolic', 8
117 Abraham G, 'Africa's Evolving Continental Court Structures : At the Crossroads?', 209 South African
Institute of International Affairs (2015), 11
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Article 46a Bis of the Protocol on Amendments vis a vis the
Constitutive Act of the AU
The wording of the Constitutive Act of the African Union enunciates the determination
of the AU to 'promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic
institutions and culture and to ensure good governance and the rule of law' and even
further to 'take all necessary measures to strengthen [the] common institutions and
provide them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them discharge their
respective mandates effectively'. 11 8
The Act further lists its principles, among them 'respect for the sanctity of human life ,
condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and
subversive activities,.11 9 The 'condemnation and rejection of impunity' herein is not
evidenced, and in fact the contrary appears to be the case with the adoption of the
immunity clause. By granting immunity to sitting leaders, the Protocol on Amendments
promotes impunity by creating incentive for them to remain in power in order to avoid
prosecution.V'' By allowing that perpetrators of intemational criminal acts to be saved
from prosecution simply by the office the hold means that the AU is taking steps to
prevent the course ofjustice goes against the letter and spirit of the Act.
One of the objectives under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Govemance is to 'protect and promote the independence of the judiciary' .121 While this
is a noble goal, it appears improbable for the AU to promote judicial independence while
in fact its own judiciary is not independent. The ACJHR would not be able to
independently take steps to bring leaders who have committed crimes in contravention
of the Protocol on Amendments to justice. It therefore cannot be a true authority on
judicial independence, let alone an example to be emulated by the African states. It
would not be able to provide the necessary support to states in pursuit of their own
independence for their judiciaries.
118 Preamble, Constitutive Act of the AU
119 Article 4 (0), Constitutive Act of the AU
120 Amadhila NNN, 'Is the African Union's decision on the ICC and the adoption of Article 46A Sis of the
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights
unlawful under international law?', Published PHDThesis, University of Cape Town, 15 September 2014,
51
121 Article 2 (5), Charter on Democracy
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These are just a few examples, but there are numerous legal instruments that the
immunity clause would be contravening and provisions in other AU statutes that could
be rendered obsolete or impracticable if the Protocol on Amendments came into force
without the deletion or drastic improvement of Article 46A bis.
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CONCLUSION: PROPOSING A WAY FORWARD
This dissertation has reiterated that immunity for sitting Heads of State and
Governments is a necessary tool under international law for the proper undertaking of
stately duties. Further, it is necessary to prevent conflict between sovereign states over
infringement on their right to autonomy and self-determination. However, emerging
jurisprudence particularly in international courts and tribunals has quashed this long
established position, and argued that under such jurisdictions as the International
Criminal Court and special courts and tribunals for prosecuting international crimes, the
right to immunity is done away with in favour of the pursuit of justice. Therefore, any
legislation to the contrary would be going against international consensus as under the
Rome Statute, specifically stated under Article 27: the principle of irrelevance of official
capacity as well as the international obligation to prosecute international cimes. It is also
argued in this paper that the decision of the Assembly of the African Union to adopt the
Protocol on Amendments inclusive of Article 46A bis is contrary to the objectives of the
constitutive act of the African Union. This piece of legislative text is, therefore,
demonstrative of political will exerting itself over the execution of justice and even the
principle ofjudicial independence. .
In doing so, the AU finds itself an accessory to the mass violations of human rights and
disregard of the rule of law and democracy. The actions of the AU, therefore encourage
the Heads of State who commit atrocious crimes under international law to hold on to
power and rule without due regard for the same. This , in a continent wrought with strife
and conflict over the same is akin to actually supporting the orchestrators of the crimes
and the crimes themselves. 122
However, all is not lost. There are certain steps that may be taken by the AU and its
Member States as well as civil society groups and the international community to ensure
that normative standards ofjustice are upheld.
122 Amadhila NNN, 'Is the African Union's decision on the ICC and the adoption of Article 46A Bis of the
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights





African nations are the members of the African Union, and they have a key role to play.
in ensuring that the organization established to oversee and offer guidance as well as
justice is able to do that. By refusing to ratify the Protocol on Amendments as it is, and
making sure that it does not come into force , the integrity of the AU is protected. Sadly
only one state- Botswana- did not support the Protocol on Amendments as it was
passed. 123 The demonstration of not only willingness but also active participation in the
fight against protecting perpetrators of international crime would perhaps be the most
effective way to do so .
Alternatively, the Assembly of African Union ought to make amendments to the
Protocol on Amendments, deleting the provisions for immunity for any person. for
crimes under international law. This retraction will not only restore faith in the
organization, but also remove the tainted image of the ACJHR which has formed even
before the ACJHR Protocol has come into force. Further and even more importantly, it
would be a direct and unquestionable stance in ensuring that leaders are held
accountable as their actions are scrutinized. The argument that a government's highest
representatives should work without fear of prosecution holds some, water at a domestic
or municipal level. However, on an international crimes scale, it is repulsive to the sense
of justice. No person accused of such crimes should hold the highest positions of
authority in a state, much less be offered protection for the same crimes on any grounds.
Finally, the African Union, in its actions discussed in this paper has shown that it can
enact legislation to hamper the working of an independent judiciary. While the ACJHR
is a creature of law- the ACJHR Protocol- the organization must ensure that whatever
subsequent or complementary laws it enacts do not go against the intended purpose of
the court. Therefore, any statues that are contrary to the Constitutive Act and the ACJHR
should not be passed, more so if the violation is of such high magnitude.
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Criminal prosecution and the trial process has the goal of finding the guilty party and
ensuring that they are liable and penalized for their crimcs.l" And while the official
tasks of certain individuals, in representing their states require the y are protected from
prosecution, the lawmaker must way such protections as against the nature of the crimes
the immunity holders are accused of. If thi s balance is not maintained, then a society
risks being overrun with the very mischiefs that led to the enactment of the laws in the
first place.
On a sociological level, the stigmatization of a person responsible for a violation of the
law has a number of consequences' i": First, it strengthens the people 's faith in the legal
system and thereby strengthening the social system itself. The public becomes confident
in the government. Second, justice is not only upheld, but is seen to be upheld, and this
has a purgative effect on the populace. On the other hand, if the sense of justice is not
fulfilled, it leaves feelings of unrest that can lead to grave consequences as the people
attempt to take the law into their own hands. Third, addressing the injustice or the crime
enables the legal system to examine the facts and the consequences and take steps to
prevent similar occurrences.
A small victory was achieved when the Protocol on Amendments officially recognized
even more crimes as being under the international criminal law jurisdiction of the AU
through the ACJHR, and more so with the tailoring of such law to the peculiarity of the
African context- for example, codification of UCG as an international crime punishable
by the court. However, the introduction of Article 46A bis into the same Protocol on
Amendments is a leap backward and may make futile all efforts to restore peace and
prevent conflict in the African continent.
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